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Abstract
Lack of primary schooling among rural children in developing countries is often at-
tributed to credit constraints and household demand for child labour, implying that direct
and indirect costs of schooling are high. Surprisingly few studies have considered the im-
portance of parentsexpected returns of investing in their childrens human capital, despite
the fact that most parents rely on their children for old-age support and subsistence. In this
paper, I propose an alternative model for human capital investment based on the house-
hold, rather than the individual child, incorporating the fact that parents bear the costs of
educating all their children and face uncertainty about the level and share of future returns.
This uncertainty can make it optimal for parents to ensure a certain degree of human cap-
ital diversication within the household. The model implications allow me to test whether
it is the need for diversication or the costs of schooling that dominate the human capital
investment decision in rural households. Using extraordinary long panel data from a rural
region in Northwestern Tanzania, I nd strong empirical evidence of diversication e¤ects
for rural sons, but not for rural daughters. Exactly in line with what should be expected
for a patrilineal society. This can potentially have far reaching policy implications.
Keywords: Schooling, child labour, human capital investment, future income uncertainty, risk diversi-
cation, liquidity constraints, Kagera, Tanzania, Africa. JEL codes: J13, J24, O15.
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1 Introduction
Schooling rates are continuously low among rural children in many developing countries. Clas-
sic human capital investment theory dictates that an individual should invest in education as
long as the discounted future returns exceed the current direct and indirect costs of such an in-
vestment, e.g. Ben-Porath (1967). Such a cost benet argument is simple and straightforward.
However, the investment decision is more complex when it comes to primary school education
of children in developing countries. The human capital investment decision is not an individual
decision for each child, but rather a joint decision made by parents for all children. The com-
plexity arises from the fact that parents bear the costs of primary education of their children,
whereas the individual child receives the future benets. Parents therefore face uncertainty
about both the level and the possible share of future returns to education.
There is a vast amount of literature on the choice of child labour and schooling among
households in developing countries. This literature has a strong emphasis on the cost side of
the human capital investment decision and the inability of parents to borrow against the future
returns of their childrens education, see Edmonds (2007). The literature so far has illustrated
that costs and credit constraints are important in the schooling decisions of households. I
investigate whether the need for risk diversication due to uncertainty about future returns is
equally important for the schooling decision. Two recent papers have introduced uncertainty
in Baland and Robinson (2000)s, by now, standard human capital investment model for the
individual child and show, analytically, that this can result in less schooling, Pouliot (2005)
and Estevan and Baland (2007). However, these papers do not make any rigorous attempt at
estimating the importance of uncertainty in the household schooling decision empirically.
In this paper, I ask the following question: Can the need for ex-ante risk diversication be
so strong that it alone results in some children not being sent to school in order to diversify
the human capital portfolio of the household? This contributes to the existing schooling and
child labour literature by focusing explicitly on the expected future returns to parents from
investing in the human capital of their children, and by modelling the human capital investment
decision jointly for all children in the household, rather than for each individual child, using
a simple human capital portfolio model. I allow for two types of human capital, general
human capital acquired through formal schooling directing children towards the urban sector,
and specic human capital acquired through traditional on-farm learning-by-doing directing
children towards the agricultural sector. The model is set up and calibrated both with and
without liquidity constraints and child labour in order to separate implications of uncertain
returns, portfolio e¤ects, from implications of costs and liquidity constraints, constraint e¤ects
on the joint schooling decision. Portfolio e¤ects result in a positive relationship between fertility
and schooling within a household, whereas constraint e¤ects result in a negative relationship.
The calibration results are essential for generating precise model predictions, which can be
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tested empirically, and thereby provide guidance in how to take the model to the data.
Both calibrations and the empirical analysis are based on a data set from a household
survey in the region of Kagera in Northwestern Tanzania with an extraordinary long time
horizon of 13 years1. The data set has detailed information on schooling, fertility and migrant
children. The long time horizon allows me to focus on households with completed fertility and
completed human capital investment decisions of all their children. In addition, issues which
are left unanswered by the model or the data, are resolved by the use of qualitative data, which
are crucial for getting a better understanding of the inuence of social norms, in particular in
terms of gender di¤erences in the schooling decision.
The analytical and empirical results show clear evidence of human capital diversication
among children within households. I nd strong empirical evidence of portfolio e¤ects consistent
with human capital diversication happening due to uncertainty, and for which I nd no other
observationally equivalent alternative. Furthermore, the positive portfolio e¤ects dominate
only among sons and not among daughters, which is exactly what the social norms would
predict for a patrilineal society as Kagera. This gender di¤erence provides strong support for
the human capital portfolio model. There are no other observationally equivalent explanation,
which can generate a similar predicted gender di¤erence. All model assumptions and other
implications are also consistent with the data.
These ndings have important for policy implications. If policy makers solely act on the
cost side of the educational decisions of the household, while the return side is neglected, the
objective of full primary school enrolment might not be achieved. The schooling system should
be able to accomodate the need for future income source diversication and provide the life
skills necessary for children to be sucessful both in the agricultural and in the urban sector.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, I describe the ethnographic evidence forming
the background for the model assumptions. In section 3, the simple portfolio model is set up
and calibrated under the di¤erent scenarios allowing for uncertainty, liquidity constraints and
child labour. Section 4 is a description of the KHDS data, while section 5 includes a detailed
empirical investigation of each of the testable model assumptions and implications. Possible
alternative explanations for the key result are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes and
policy implications are discussed.
2 Ethnographic Evidence
Rural Kagera is, in many ways, a very di¤erent setting from modern industrialised societies,
also in terms of social norms and expectations about the role of parents, as well as the role
of children. The inuence of norms is di¢ cult to detect in quantitative empirical analyses.
1The Kagera Health and Development Survey, KHDS I+II.
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Qualitative data can therefore be useful complements, especially when the set of norms dicussed
is di¤erent from ones own reference set. Lassen and I therefore decided to collect qualitative
data from 12 out of the 49 KHDS sample villages in Kagera to gain local insight, Lassen and
Lilleør (2005).
During semi-structured focus group discussions on schooling, family, networks, migration
and old-age security, a certain picture emerged about norms and expectations in the relationship
between parents and children. First, it quickly became clear that old-aged people rst and
foremost rely on their children for subsistence and care. If they have no children or these fail
to provide the assistance needed, old-age support can also be provided by clan members or by
fellow villagers who then, in return, would inherit any assets. The property one has may help
him when he is sick as he may sell some so as to get some money or may give a will to someone
he trusts to take care of him and take his property when he dies..."Take care of me and you will
take me property when I die."(Cluster 12). Old people without assets or faithfull or loving
children can expect little assistance.
Second, the expected assistance from children di¤ers depending on their gender, education
and residence. Norms clearly dictate that sons should provide for their old-aged parents,
whereas daughters cannot be expected to do so. Once married the obligations of daughters lie
with their family in-law. A boy is the heir of the family because a girl will later on be married
and go away (...) a girl is likely to benet the clan of her husband, (Cluster 8) and educating
a girl is taking the whole wealth to her in-laws, (Cluster 21). There is even a local saying in
Haya "Omswisiki taba wawe", meaning the daughter is always not yours, (Cluster 21), and
a ritual linked to the gender di¤erence already when infants: When a female child is born, at
the age of three months she is brought into the living room and directed to front door facing
out as a ritual that she will have to leave the family when she is old enough, (Cluster 50).
Even so, it seems that many daughters still try to help their old age parents as much as they
can, and they are therefore often considered more faithfulland show more lovethan their
brothers, (Cluster 17). This expectation of daughters being more loving, is repeatedly given as
a reason for sending girls to school in the hope of future returns even though she will marry
and belong to the familiy of a di¤erent clan. Girls have a reputation of caring more for their
parents than boys when they succeed in life, (Cluster 23). Boys tend to forget their past and
their families. (Cluster 8). The focus group in cluster 50 very clearly stated the dilemma of
parents, when asked who would be given priority in terms of schooling if they had to choose
between a daughter and a son. The participants said that they would send a boy in case they
had to choose. This is because the boy is expected to become the successor when parents die.
If the boy was not the successor the girl would be sent to school because she is more likely
to help the parents. In addition, schooling may be important for the marriage market. It is
easier for [girls with primary school] to be married to a highly educated person, (Cluster 50).
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On the other hand, there also seems to be fear of pregnancy if girls attend school in teenage
years girls are more likely to get pregnant which will result in drop out, (Cluster 19) .
Third, the expected migration pattern, and with it, the type of old-age assistance, also seems
to di¤er for sons and daughters. Whereas marriage seems to be the primary factor determining
the migration of a daughter, education is the key for whether or not a son migrates. Sons
without primary school are not expected to migrate and mainly fail if they do so because their
familiarity lies in the local agricultural environment. They will engage in farming and be of
general assistance to their parents in terms of supplying farm produce, manual work, and
nursing the sick. Their education limits them from gaining more than their working strength.
Since they live closer to their families they assist on daily events, (Cluster 13). Likewise, on
the general description of an uneducated son they note that His most important asset is his
own strength which can be used any where that he is familiar with, He will attend all the
cultural practices for the family, and help the father with manual works, His help is important
as he is used to the environment [of the village] , (Cluster 50). In return for his assistance, a
son without formal education expects all life support, e.g. shamba, from parents so he has to
work hard for them, (Cluster 21).
Sons with education, on the other hand, are seen as likely to migrate out of the rural village,
and their assistance will be in terms of remittances, upon request, if they succeed in life and are
good or loving sons that do not forget their past and their family. The educated migrant son
sends more remittances as much as he can to keep his family relative to his income, (Cluster10),
sends cash money when requested, more than once, and has good income but only responds
to the call of the father., When married he turns weak to his wife. He concentrates on his
household and lives an expensive life while he is forgetting his [parental] family, (Cluster 50).
In addition, migrant children living far away are generally thought of as harder to reach and
less reliable when it come to ald-age assistance. The focus group in cluster 12 pointed this out
by using a Swahili saying "Fimbo ya mbali haiui nyoka - the far stick cannot kill a snake" This
gives excuse for the child staying in distant places. Parents will not have more expectations to
those children staying far.Parents thus loose control over migrant children.
Fourth, schooling in itself also carries an element of uncertainty. It is seen as risky if
the educated child is not able to nd employment and does not become self-dependent, but
rather continues as a burden to the parents. It is seen as not risky if the educated child
nds employment, becomes self-dependentand as a good investmentif he, in addition, is a
lovingchild and starts remitting. Schooling is a good investment when a child does not turn
back to the parents to depend on them, (Cluster 12). Every parent expects to benet from
the good result with investment on their children (...) a farmer planting good seeds, he always
expects to get good yields, the value of education is seen especially when a child gets success,
(Cluster 19). Primary education is the good investment only if: a child after school does not
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depend on parents, but works for himself; if he/she is employed by the government, a child will
be sure of monthly salary and out of this will be helping the parents at home; if he/she remits
home, (Cluster 17).
Finally, it was mentioned repeatedly, by the use of a Haya proverb, that if other migrant
children in the village were doing well and remitting home, this would have a positive inuence
on the parents decision to send their own children to school: "Rutachuba talima ntanu -
without jealousy you cannot open a new banana farm" meaning one cannot be successful,
(e.g. Cluster 12, 13, and 23). That is, only if you also wish do do well when you see others
doing well, will you succeed. The concept of jealousyis used in a positive manner, incentives
to invest in schooling are improved, when others are able to generate good returns from the
same type of investment.
3 Model
As outlined above, parents have di¤erent expectations and face di¤erent uncertainties about
future assistance from their chidlren, depending on the gender, schooling and residence. This
section provides a simple portfolio model of the human capital investment decisions faced by
parents with more than one child. The model is set up as a two period model, where children are
educated in the rst period and, as adults, provide for their parents in the second period. The
model di¤ers from most models in the existing child labour literature, because it incorporates
old-age dependency on children; parental uncertainty about the future income from children;
sibling dependency in the human capital investment decision; and a clear distinction between
the urban and the agricultural sector. The model is set up to analyse the e¤ects of uncertainty
about future income transfers from children to parents on the present human capital investment
decisions parents have to make on behalf of their young children. The model and its underlying
assumptions generate a set of empirical implications, which can be directly tested in the data.
Some of these implications di¤er markedly from the ones generated by conventional theories
of child labour. I do not distinguish between gender in the model, but given the qualitative
ndings, the model is expected only to hold for sons.
3.1 A Basic Portfolio Model
The model is a unitary household model, where parents function as a unied sole decision
maker. It consists of two periods, t = 1; 2, and there is no discounting of the future and no
interest rate on savings or credit. The model will be calibrated under two di¤erent scenarios
in section 3.2 to facilitate comparison of the empirical implications of the model with those of
more conventional theories of child labour and human capital investment. Below, the model is
outlined under a no liquidity constraint, no child labourscenario. Later, I will impose both
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liquidity constraints and child labour.
In the rst period, parents earn agricultural income Y1; which they allocate between rst
period household consumption c1, savings s; and the education expenses for their N children.
N is assumed to be exogenously given, since the emphasis here is not on the e¤ect of uncertainty
on fertility decisions, but on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the joint human capital investment
decision of children, given the fertility of the household.2 There are two types of education in
the model, general formal education achieved through primary schooling and specic traditional
education achieved through on-farm learning-by-doing. Traditional education directs children
towards future employment in the agricultural sector (a), whereas formal education directs
children towards future employment in the non-agricultural urban sector (b) in the second
period. Parents face a discrete choice for each of the N children of whether he or she should
be educated traditionally or formally. A child can only receive one type of education3.
In the second period, traditionally educated children earn agricultural income, ya2 , whereas
formally educated children earn urban income, yb2: Parents do not generate any income in the
second period, but rely fully on their savings and the joint agricultural and urban income
transfers from their N children for second period household consumption, c2. Second period
income is uncertain. Parents therefore maximise a joint von Neuman-Morgenstern expected
utility function dened over and separable in household consumption, ct, where t = 1; 2: The
utility function is assumed to be concave, such that U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0: The household
solves the following maximisation problem
max
;s
EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2) (1)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb   s (2)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2) + s
where  is the proportion of children, which parents chose to educate formally through school-
ing. That is,  is the portfolio allocation of children between traditional and formal human
capital investments. The number of children who receive schooling in the rst period is thus
given by N and the number who are educated within the traditional agricultural based sys-
tem is (1 )N .4 The total amount of educational expenses is (1 )Nea+Neb; where ea is
2 It is conceivable that the fertility decision and the human capital investment decision of the born and unborn
children are both inuenced by the parentspreference for old-age security, which suggests modelling the two
decisions jointly. However, to keep things simple, I focus on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the human
capital investmnet decision of children conditional on the household having completed their fertility.
3This is a simplifying assumption. The choice here is not on how many hours a child spends in school or
working, but rather whether he or she graduates with full primary school education or not.
4For analytical simplicity,  is written as continuous in the theoretical model, but it will be treated as discrete
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the educational expenditure for each child in traditional education, e.g. supervisional costs of
parents, and eb is the educational expenditure for each child in formal education, e.g. tuition
fees and uniform costs. Educational expenditures are allowed to di¤er over the two sectors,
and they are, for now, both non-negative and therefore considered as a cost.5
Second period consumption will equal any capital transfers from period one in terms of
savings or dissavings, s, plus a fraction, 1=N of total income from all children. Total second
period of the children amounts to the agricultural sector income (1   )Nya2 ; and the urban
sector income Nyb2. Children are assumed to transfer a certain fraction of their income to their
parents. The fraction is the same for all children, irrespective of their sector of employment,
but it depends on their number of siblings for  > 0: When assuming 0 <  < 1; there will
be a positive, but diminishing marginal e¤ect of having more children on total second period
income received from children.
While second period urban income will come from migrant children, second period agricul-
tural income will come from home children educated by their parents. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that, to the extend that parents have actually concentrated on passing on their spe-
cic human capital skills to their children, the second period agricultural income of these, ya2
will be positively correlated with the current agricultural income of the parents, Y1; such that
ya2 = f(Y1); where f
0 > 0: Furthermore, not only specic human capital will matter for the
agricultural productivity of children, but also the inputs available at local level, which are likely
to be highly correlated over generations.
Savings can be negative, and both the discount rate and the interest rate are normalised to
unity and are thus explicitly left out of the model for simplicity. By assuming perfect credit
markets, I can ignore any e¤ect of liquidity constraints on the schooling decision and thus focus
on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital portfolio decision of all N
children in the household. The quation is: can this alone result in less than full school enrolment
among siblings, i.e. a model prediction of at least one child being educated traditionally and
thus resulting in  < 1 solely due to uncertainty about future income transfers.
When there are no liquidity constraints, parents are faced with two choice variables; how
much to save or dissave s; and which proportion of their children to educate formally through
schooling ; the human capital portfolio allocation. The rst order condition with respect to s
in the calibrations.
5While the literature on child labour and schooling generally set ea as negative and thus as a source of income,
I here follow Bock (2002) in stating that the overall learning potential in the tasks completed by children in
agriculture is higher than the immediate return. If children were only undertaking tasks with no learning, but
high immediate output, such as fetching water or rewoods, there would be no transfer of farm-specic human
capital from parents to children and therefore no future agricultural return from such activities. thus for ea to
be an educational expense, children have to be allocated tasks of with a certain degree of complexity and, thus,
a learning potential. See Lilleør (2008) for more detail.
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is6
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2) (3)
That is, savings s will be chosen such that marginal utility in period one equals the expected
marginal utility of period two. The rst order condition with respect to  is given by equation
(4), where  is the optimal solution for the maximisation problem above
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for 0 <  < 1
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) > E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 0
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) < E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 1
(4)
Parents face two sources of uncertainty with respect to future income transfers from their
children. There is uncertainty about the future employment of a child, but there can also be
uncertainty about whether the successful child will send the expected level of remittances to
his parents, that is an uncertainty about whether the child is a lovingchild or not, as noted
by some of the focus group participants. Lucas and Stark (1985) emphasise how parents may
be more likely to loose control or family command over migrant children as compared to home
children.7
In the following, I assume, that there is no covariant uncertainty between second period
transfers from children in the urban sector and children in the agricultural sector. This allows
me to simplify the problem by normalising uncertainty about agricultural remittances to zero,
and thus solely focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty about urban remittances or income transfers
on the optimal proportion of children in formal schooling, . This is not to say that there is
no uncertainty associated with agricultural income transfers or in-kind assistance, but rather
that uncertainty associated with transfers from distant migrant children in the urban sector is
higher. Urban migrants face higher income levels, but also relatively more variation, since the
urban labour market entails a fundamental risk of unemployment, which is not present among
subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, parents may also perceive the size
and the frequency of remittances from urban migrant children to be more uncertain compared
to the daily support and in-kind assistance from home children engaged in local agricultural
sector8. Finally, because ya2 is likely to be strongly correlated with Y1, parents will be able to
make more precise predictions about the future value of ya2 given their priors, than about the
future value of yb2:
6When liquidity constraints are imposed s = 0 and parents only have one choice variable, : The maximisation
problem therefore reduces to one rst order condition, eq. (4) below.
7For a detailed literature review on this subject, please refer to Lilleør (2008).
8This is, in e¤ect, an agency problem between parents and migrant children. The degree of success of migrant
children is harder to monitor for parents and family control is likely to decrease with the distance. Social sanctions
are often mentioned as e¤ective means in overcoming such agency problems and thereby helping to reduce at
least one source of future uncertainty. Lassen and Lilleør (2008) analyse the e¤ect of such sanctions on the
demand for formal schooling.
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In short, the uncertainty faced by parents about second period income is modelled for the
urban sector, where each migrant child can either get a good (typically formal sector) job or
not; and where migrant children in good jobs can remit more than migrant children without a
good job, but they may not do so. This is modelled as a simple mean preserving spread, where
lovingchildren with good jobs remit a share of their high urban income, yb2 = + "; whereas
less lovingchildren with good jobs mimic children without good jobs and thus only remit a
share of a low urban income, yb2 =   ": Second period urban income is given by
yb2 =
(
+ "
  "
w.p.
w.p.
p = 0:5
(1  p) = 0:5
The mean and the variance for each child in the urban sector is E(yb2) =  and V ar(y
b
2) = "
2;
respectively: The expected total income transfers in period 2 from all the N formally educated
children in the urban sector, is simply E(N1 yb2) = N1 ; independent of the degree of
correlation among children in the uncertainty structure. However, the variance of the expected
total income transfers, V ar(N1 yb2) and the covariance in the rst order condition for ,
cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) will both depend on the degree of correlation. I consider the two extremes
of either perfect correlation or perfect uncorrelation in the uncertainty structure of urban
remittances. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. When there is perfect correlation
in " among migrant siblings, they will all either have a good draw and be good remitters,
and then their income transfers will amount to N1 ( + "); or they will all have a bad
draw or all be bad remitters, and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (   "),
hence the variance is V ar(N1 yb2) = 2N2 2"2. When the individual "s are perfectly
uncorrelated, migrant children all face the same urban labour market lottery irrespective of
the labour market outcomes of their siblings and they decide independently on their level of
remittances to parents. The variance under no risk correlation is thus smaller and depends on
the binomial coe¢ cient
 
N
i

, where i denotes the number of successful siblings in the urban
labour market (i.e. those where yb2 = +") and N is the total number of siblings in the urban
sector in the second period, V ar(N1 yb2) = N 
NP
i=0
 
N
i

1
2N
(i"  (N   i)")2 = N1 "2:
As long as there is no covariance between the uncertainty associated with the agricultural
sector income transfers and the uncertainty associated with urban sector income transfers,
households will have an incentive to diversify their human capital investments between these
two sectors to reduce future risk exposure. If the need for diversication away from the urban
sector is strong enough, that is the second period covariance term, cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) is
su¢ ciently negative, this will have a negative impact on the number of children sent to school
in the optimal human capital portfolio of the household, . It will then be optimal for the risk
averse parents to direct one or more children towards future employment in the agricultural
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sector by educating them traditionally on the farm.
3.2 Model Calibrations
In the following, I rst calibrate the portfolio model using standard CRRA preferences under
both the no liquidity constraint, no child labourscenario, and later introduce both liquidity
constraints and child labour. By doing so, I am able to separate out which empirical im-
plications originate from uncertainty and the portfolio model as such, and which empirical
implications originate from a household being liquidity constrained.
The model is calibrated using simple summary statistics from the KHDS data (see table
4.1 for detail). It is calibrated for the average rural household, using the average values for
household expenditure as a proxy for agricultural income, Y1 and ya2 and for number of children
N , while the village average is used for schooling expenditure. Second period urban income,
yb2 is proxied by the average level of household expenditure in urban areas. All expenditure
variables are measured as daily adult equivalent terms in USD. Calibrating the model based
on real data is helpful in determining the relative levels of exogenous variables. The variable
values and their normalisation in the calibrations are listed below in table 3.1
Table 3.1. Summary statistics of KHDS variables and their model equivalents.
KHDS I variable KHDS data Normalisation Model
AE daily HH expenditure, urban HHs mean 0.75 2.02 yb2
s.d. 0.86 1.78 "
Rural Households
AE daily HH expenditure, agricultural HHs mean 0.37 1 Y1= ya2
s.d. 0.20 0
Annual school expenditure, cluster mean mean 4.65 0.03 eb
Total number of children in HH mean 8.21 N
Proportion of children in/through school mean 0.67 
# Rural Households in sample 365
Note: All expenditure amounts are in USD, where 1 USD =455 Tsh. AE: adult equivalent
In the calibrations, I assume that the correlation between rst period parental agricultural
income and second period agricultural income of children is perfect and that the mapping is 1:1.
That is, parents transfer all of their specic human capital skills through traditional education
to the children destined for agriculture. Agricultural income levels in the two periods are
normalised to unity, Y1 = ya2 = 1 with zero standard deviation. This results in an adjustment
of the urban sector second period income, such that E(yb2) =  = 0:75=0:37 = 2:02 and
the uncertainty measure, here proxied by the standard deviation, " = s:d:(yb2) = (0:86  
0:20)=0:37 = 1:78: The annual expenditures of schooling in rural areas, including school fees
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and school uniform costs, are 3% of household expenditures per child, thus eb = 0:03: Since
I have no plausible measure of the supervision costs of traditional education, I simply set it
at half of the schooling costs, such that ea = 0:015 under the no liquidity, no child labour
scenario. Thus, for the average KHDS household formal education is always more protable
than traditional education. The question is then how much uncertainty about future returns
to formal education is needed for the household to diversify future income sources and thus
educate at least one child traditionally.
In the following, graphs are calibrated using  = 2 as the relative risk aversion parameter
in the CRRA utility function. To avoid heavy consumption smoothing incentives,  = 0:95
and thereby ensuring that rst and second period consumption are of the same magnitude. In
the graphs, yb2; ; ; e
a and eb are held constant, whereas N;Y1 = ya2 and " are allowed to vary.
The urban income transfer uncertainty, " runs in the [0; 2] interval, thereby including in the
upper end the actual expenditure spread present in the data of " = 1:78. For the maximum
level of uncertainty (" = 2), the migrant child is in a situation of virtually no income or an
income four times that of the agricultural sector. The number of children, N can vary from
2-16. Although the total number of children on average is 8, the average number of sons is 4.
Given the qualitative ndings on gender di¤erences, the model is likely to be less applicable to
girls. I will return to this in the empirical analysis below. Finally, note that since the model is
calibrated for discrete numbers of children,  is also of a discrete character.
3.2.1 No liquidity constraints and no child labour
The main contribution of the simple portfolio model above is captured in gure 3.1. It shows
the e¤ect of uncertainty on the human capital investment decision under perfect correlation
and uncorrelation in the uncertainty measure "; respectively.
[Figure 3.1]
For " = 0, there is no future uncertainty and thus no need for future income source diver-
sication. The household will always choose the optimal corner solution for , which for the
average KHDS household is  = 1: For low levels of ", the household does not alter its opti-
mal human capital allocation between the traditional agricultural sector and formal schooling.
However, as the uncertainty about future income transfers from migrant children increases, the
need for future income source diversication shifts the optimal portfolio allocation away from
100% enrolment in schooling. There is nothing new about this. For any risk averse agent,
there is an optimal trade-o¤ between risk and returns of investments. What is new is that this
is applied to the human capital investment decision of rural households in developing coun-
tries. The key point here is that even in a world of no liquidity constraints and no immediate
returns to child labour, households would still not send all of their children to school if there
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is a certain level of uncertainty or risk associated with returns to schooling. For the average
KHDS household with 8 children, this implies that for an income spread in the urban sector
of " = 1:8, roughly as we see in the data, the optimal proportion of children in school under
the two extremes of either perfect correlation or perfect uncorrelation in the " risk measure,
 is 0:875 and 0:125, respectively. This should be compared to the actual intra-household
proportion of children with formal education of  = 0:67; which is right in between.
Allowing for sibling dependency is one of the main contributions of the portfolio model
compared to the existing literature on child labour. The e¤ect of changes in N on  can be
characterised as the portfolio e¤ect. Analysing the human capital investment decision of the
full set of children jointly, rather than for each child independently and then adding up, yields
very di¤erent results because the total number of children inuences the covariance term in
the rst order condition for . Standard model on child labour and schooling typically set the
number of children to one for simplicity, e.g. Baland and Robinson (2000), Ranjan (1999),
and Basu and Van (1998). These model more or less explicitly argue, that the decision is
identical for all n children. They therefore implicitly assume away any sibling dependency
in the schooling or child labour decisions. Such models will, by construction, always predict
a corner solution for  since the household schooling rate is given by n times the optimal
solution for the individual child. Interior solutions for  can, in such models, only be the result
of changes in the household resources over time, such that some children may have been subject
to binding liquidity constraints, others not. In the portfolio model, the disregard for sibling
dependence corresponds to looking at the case of N = 1 and then subsequently applying that
specic solution for  to all children. For N = 1, the model predicts that when " > 1:4; the
optimal choice of  shifts from schooling to agriculture under a relative risk aversion parameter
of  = 2: And, when "  1:4 the household will always send all children to school ( = 1), and
for " > 1:4 the household sends none ( = 0). Looking at gure 3.1, this is clearly not the
case for N > 1. There is an obvious portfolio e¤ect on  of changes in N: There is even some
indication of convergence as N increases.
[Figure 3.2]
Figure 3.2 is an alternative illustration of the same results. It show the e¤ect of changes
in N on  for di¤erent levels of uncertainty. For the uncorrelated " = 1:78, there is a clear
positive e¤ect on  of increases in N until  reaches the neighbourhood of 0.8, where it seems
to stabilise. For the perfectly correlated "; the convergence happens much earlier and the clear
cut positive e¤ects of N on  are only present for low levels of N . This is not surprising. By
introducing perfect correlation in "; I am assuming the same outcome for all migrant children.
Thus, the risk diversication can only take place between the rural and urban sector, whereas
for uncorrelated " it can take place both between the rural and urban sector as well as among
the migrant children within the urban sector.
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The e¤ects of changes in parental agricultural income Y1, in , and in the probability of
parent receiving remittances in the second period from the migrant children, p are all trivial.
Although it should be noted that the sectoral divide in returns to education generates a negative
e¤ect of high agricultural income on  once the traditional agricultural sector becomes a
protable risk-free alternative to formal education. There is a positive e¤ect on  when  = 1
compared to  = 0: Finally, there is a clear positive e¤ect on  of increases in p, i.e. the higher
the probability of receiving second period remittance, the more protable is the investment in
formal human capital and parents will choose to send a larger proportion of their children to
school9.
The most interesting point to take from this exercise is that uncertainty matters for the
human capital investment decision. Potentially it matters a lot. Even in a world conducive
in any aspect, but risk, to full school enrolment, a simple model of utility maximisation with
standard risk averse agents predicts optimal intra-household school enrolment rates well below
unity for actual levels of urban income spread.
3.2.2 Liquidity constraints and child labour
When the model is calibrated under liquidity constraints, there is no transfer of capital between
periods and s = 010: Parents are thus maximising eq. (1) with respect to  subject to
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb (5)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2)
For the model to resemble the standard child labour and schooling literature as much as
possible, there should also be high opportunity costs of schooling in terms of child labour.
This is achieved by ensuring that the immediate return to traditional education outweighs
the learning costs associated with the task complexity, such that ea < 0: This means that
 ea resembles a wage for each child in the agricultural sector. However, child labour is still
regarded as a means of acquiring traditional education and thereby future agricultural returns,
such that ya2 is tied to the parental level of Y1: If the type of child labour in question is indeed
detrimental to human capital accumulation of the child and thus to his future agricultural
earning capabilities, a stronger version of child labour should be imposed where ya2 < Y1
because only an incomplete transfer of specic human capital from parents to the child has
taken place. In the following, I assume full transfer of specic human capital skills from parents
to the traditionally educated children, thus setting ya2 = Y1:
9 It should be noted that as soon as p 6= 0:5, the uncertainty is no longer modelled as a mean preserving
spread and thus increasing p has two implications. It increases both the mean and the variance of second period
urban income transfers.
10 In the calibrations, I allow s  0.
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The introduction of a liquidity constraint, where households no longer can borrow against
future income (s  0), has the expected negative e¤ect on the proportion of children sent to
school, but only in households with many children, see gure 3.3. For households with up
to eight children, there is no e¤ect on  when the uncertainty measure is uncorrelated and
only a slight negative e¤ect of the liquidity constraint under perfectly correlated "s. Under no
uncertainty, the liquidity constraint only really binds for N  10, which is equivalent of the
schooling expenditure amounting to 30% of total household expenditure.
[Figure 3.3]
While the inability to borrow against future income is most likely reality for most households
in developing countries, the true cost of schooling, it is often argued, has to be measured in terms
of the opportunity costs of childrens time. The model is therefore also calibrated allowing for
not only future but also immediate returns to traditional education and thereby introducing the
concept of child labour. This is simply done by setting ea =  0:03: One child in the agricultural
sector can then nance one child in school. These immediate returns to children engaged in the
agricultural sector in the rst period o¤ers a possibility of improved consumption smoothing
between period one and two, compared to the situation of no immediate returns to traditional
agricultural education. Under no uncertainty, the liquidity constraint now binds for N  4,
see gure 3.4:
[Figure 3.4]
It is also clear from gure 3.3. and 3.4 that for the special case of N = 1, which is the
standard case in the schooling and child labour literature, there is no e¤ect on the optimal
decision of introducing liquidity constraints and only a very marginal e¤ect of also introducing
child labour. The optimal education choice shifts from formal to traditional education in
agriculture at " = 1:5 when there is no child labour, and at " = 1:4 when there is child
labour. The, by the child labour literature, predicted strong e¤ects of households being liquidity
constrained are thus hard to conrm analytically for one-child households given the numerical
values for school costs and household income.
The pure portfolio e¤ect of changes in N on  is contaminated once the household is
liquidity constrained. However, since the constraint only really binds for households with more
than four (ten) children with (without) the introduction of child labour, the portfolio e¤ect is
less a¤ected by the liquidity constraint for lower levels N: This is also clear from gures 3.5
and 3.6 below, which corresponds to gure 3.2 only now the household is liquidity constrained
(gure 3.5) and is also able to benet from immediate returns to childrens engagement in
agriculture, i.e. child labour (gure 3.6).
[Figure 3.5] & [Figure 3.6]
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In order to analyse the e¤ect of variations in agricultural income on the optimal portfolio
allocation, I let rst and second period agricultural income vary in the interval Y1 = ya2 =
[0:2; 3]. Thereby it is possible to analyse the e¤ects of income when the liquidity constraint is
strong for low levels of Y1 as well as when the agricultural returns make traditional education
an attractive alternative to formal education for high levels of ya2 . For households with N = 4,
the simple liquidity constraint is binding for agricultural income levels below Y1 < 0:5 in the
sense that it is optimal for the household not to send all four children to school. Allowing for
child labour, the household will allocate at least one child to the agricultural sector for income
levels below Y1 < 1:1; despite future returns to agriculture being very low.
[Figure 3.7] & [Figure 3.8]
From gure 3.7 and 3.8 it is clear, that this yields interesting empirical implications. The
e¤ect of increases in agricultural income is positive when the liquidity constraint is binding, but
negative for higher levels of agricultural income, when the agricultural (here risk free) sector
o¤ers returns to traditional education which can match the returns to formal education. This
generates an inverse U shaped relationship between the proportion of children in school and
income. The strength of this inverse U shape is, not surprisingly, a¤ected by the degree of risk
aversion given to the utility function, but is nevertheless present both for  = 1 and  = 3:
Finally, it should be noted, that the interval of negative e¤ect of high agricultural income
on  increases as " increase. That is, the turning point for the inverse U shape shifts inwards
as uncertainty increases. This is obvious from gure 3.7 and 3.8 above. For " = 0, the shift
from formal to traditional education happens when agricultural income reaches the mean level
of urban income, but as " increases the shift happens for lower levels of agricultural income.
3.3 Empirical Implications
The di¤erences between the model implications under the di¤erent scenarios guides the em-
pirical analysis below. It is not possible to identify the true e¤ect of uncertainty about future
remittance on schooling, but by using the set of model implications as guidelines, it is possi-
ble to test whether the empirical ndings are indicative of the existence of uncertainty in the
human capital investment decision.
The main implication of the portfolio model is that uncertainty about future income trans-
fers from children, " has a negative e¤ect on the optimal proportion of children educated
formally, . Empirically, it is virtually impossible to nd an appropriate measure of the un-
certainty perceived by parents, it relates both to the uncertainty about the future urban labour
market for each of the migrant children, and to the uncertainty about the intergenerational
contract, that is whether children, if successful in the labour market, will in fact send the
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expected remittances.11 There are, however, a set of testable empirical implications of the
model and its assumptions. Each of these are indirectly a test of the model. If just one of
them is rejected in the data, the relevance of the model is clearly questionable when it comes
to analysing the human capital investment decisions within the household.
I will distinguish between the empirical implications relating to the model assumptions and
those relating to the existence of uncertainty. Although the assumptions of the model are
based on previous ndings and conclusions in the literature (for a detailed literature review,
see Lilleør (2008)), they should also be consistent with the data at hand in order for the model
implications to be of any empirical contribution.
There are three central assumptions, which have to be consistent with the data: (i) urban
income levels and urban income spreads are assumed to be higher than agricultural income
levels and spreads, respectively, but without stochastically dominating the agricultural income
distribution; (ii) parents are assumed to rely on their children for old-age support; and (iii) it
assumed that there is a sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education. That is,
there are only returns to formal education in the urban sector and only returns to traditional
education in the agricultural sector. In addition, these three assumptions generate two empirical
implications, which also have to be consistent with the data: (i) there should be an inverse
U relationship between the proportion of children in school and agricultural income; (ii) the
probability of receiving remittances from migrant children should have a positive e¤ect on the
proportion of children in formal education. I return to the empirical tests of each of these
assumptions and their model implications in section 5 below.
The uncertainty aspect of the human capital portfolio model also yields testable empirical
implications: (i) the overall low enrolment rate in primary schools should to a large extend
be caused by within household variation rather than between household corner solutions of
zero or full enrolment; (ii) the empirical e¤ect of the total number of children on the optimal
human capital portfolio of the household can give indications of the relative strength of a
portfolio e¤ect and thus of the inuence of uncertainty and risk management considerations in
the human capital investment decision relative to the constraint e¤ects; and (iii) the portfolio
e¤ect should only be found among sons, not daughters, if the qualitative ndings on gender
di¤erences with respect to norms for old age support can be generalised. Testing all of these
implications empirically is a test of whether the model is consistent with the ndings in the
data.
While the rst empirical implication of the model, that the majority of intra-household
schooling rates should not be at a corner, is necessary for the model to have any relevance
11Lassen and Lilleør (2008) analyse the e¤ect of reduced uncertainty about remittances on schooling by using
variation in civil society structures and social norms across villages, captured by a tribal fractionalisation index.
Even so, the analysis captures the e¤ect of di¤erences in expected income transfers rather than the e¤ect of
di¤erences in their spread and, thus, the risk.
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at all, it is also a very general implication supported by many alternative hypotheses about
schooling and child labour.
The most central empirical implication of the model is therefore the positive portfolio e¤ect
of N on : This implication requires the portfolio e¤ect to dominate any negative e¤ect of
liquidity constraints. It is thus not only a (somewhat restrictive) test of the portfolio model as
such, but also a test of the relevance of the portfolio model compared to the general liquidity
constraint explanation in the literature. This implication is central because it only holds
for positive levels of "; which, in the calibrations above, as a minimum needs to be in the
neighbourhood of " = 1 (which means an income spread of the same size as the average level
of agricultural income), making it an indirect test of whether future income uncertainty a¤ects
the human capital investment portfolio of the household today. If it is possible to identify
a positive portfolio e¤ect of N on  empirically, then the model provides an unambiguous
indication of sibling dependence in the need for risk diversication, and thus an indication of
income uncertainty a¤ecting the choice of human capital investment.12 However, if the e¤ect of
N on  is zero or negative, the model cannot provide any unambiguous conclusions of whether
the human capital investments in the household are inuenced by future income uncertainty.
Thus, testing the e¤ect of N on  negative is not necessarily a rejection of the model, it could
be due to a dominance of the liquidity constraint e¤ects compared to the portfolio e¤ect, or it
could simply be that there is no portfolio e¤ect.
Most of the empirical implications are straightforward and fairly constant over the di¤erent
scenarios. However, two of the implications are less so. Their calibration results are therefore
summarised in table 3.2. The table gives a brief overview of the model predictions with respect
to the e¤ects of fertility, N; and income, Y1 on the optimal proportion of children in school, 
under the three di¤erent scenarios of liquidity constraints (LC) and child labour (CL) and for
di¤erent values of and correlations structures in the uncertainty measure, ". It is clear from
the table that a positive e¤ect of N on  is only possible for high levels of uncertainty and it is
only unambiguous when " is uncorrelated across migrant children and there is no child labour,
ea > 0. In the remaining cases, the positive e¤ect of N is only dominant for low levels of N:
The relationship between  and N is therefore likely to be non-monotonic. In the following
empirical analysis, I will therefore test for di¤erent functional forms, including a fully exible
non-parametric specication.
12This, of course, hinges upon the positive e¤ect of N not being driven purely by observationally equivalent
alternatives, I will return to this in section 6 below.
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Table 3.2. Empirical implications
no LC, no CL LC,no CL LC, CL
s 7 0; ea= 0:015 s  0; ea= 0:015 s  0; ea=  0:03
" = 0 " < 1 "  1 " = 0 " < 1 "  1 " = 0 " < 1 "  1
d
dN corr " = 0  0 7 0 = 0 < 0 7 0 < 0 < 0 7 0
uncorr " = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 7 0 < 0 < 0 7 0
d
dY1
corr " = 0  0  0 inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U
uncorr " = 0  0  0 inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U inv U
Note: For d

dY1
, the total number of children is held constant at N = 4; corresponding to the average
number of sons in a household. The negative e¤ect of Y1 on 
exists for lower levels of Y1 as " increases.
The non-monotonic relationship between agricultural income and the proportion of children
in school is an interesting point relative to the existing literature on child labour, where non-
monotonicity is often used to explain weak empirical e¤ects of household economic status on
schooling enrolment or child labour. The reasons given for non-monotonicity are generally
based on local non-linearities for certain intervals in the data. This can stem from imperfection
in the land and/or labour markets (Bhalotra and Heady (2003)), from discrepancies between
own judgement and childrens judgement of the economic status of parents in old age and thus
expectations of low future intergenerational transfers if parents are not poor enoughseen with
the eyes of the children (Rogers and Swinnerton (2004)), from dramatic non-linearities in the
neighbourhood of the poverty line because as soon as parents can a¤ord not to let their children
work, they will do so, as suggested by the luxury axiomof Basu and Van (1998) and tested
empirically on Vietnamese data by Edmonds (2005).
Non-monotonicity in the relation between economic status and child labour or schooling
could also arise as a global phenomenon. Edmonds touch upon this in handbook chapter on
child labour, where he notes that a positive relationship between child labour and economic
status can be explained by employment opportunities, Edmonds (2007). This is exactly what
the assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education is about.
Learning-by-doing in agriculture generates future returns in the agricultural sector, schooling
generates future returns in the formal urban sector. If the urban employment opportunities are
limited, and the expected returns to formal schooling therefore low or if agricultural incomes
are high, the traditional educational alternative of the agricultural sector is therefore relatively
more attractive. The assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to education therefore generates
an empirical implication of global non-monotonicity. For low levels of agricultural income, the
liquidity constraint is binding and the agricultural sector as such is unattractive, increasing
income will therefore have a positive e¤ect on the optimal allocation of children in formal
schooling. However, if the agricultural income levels are high enough to be able to compete with
urban income levels, the traditional educational alternative becomes relatively more attractive
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and the optimal human capital portfolio shifts more towards future agricultural employment,
that is as Y1 = ya2 get high enough,  starts falling again. This generates a negative or an
inverse U relationship between agricultural income and the optimal : This generates a very
simple alternative explanation for a possible non-monotonic relationship between income and
schooling or child labour among rural household. Such a hypothesis is easy to test in the data.
Finally, it should be noted that the interval in which there is a negative e¤ect of Y1 on 
increases as uncertainty " increases, that is the turning point for the inverse U relation between
Y1 and  moves inwards. This is natural consequence of risk aversion, once the variance of
future urban income increases, the risk-free alternative becomes more attractive even though
the expected mean is lower. This implication of the model is harder to test directly, although
gender di¤erences indicate that uncertainty should matter more for sons than for daughters
and thus a direct implication would be that the turning point of the inverse U is lower for sons
than for daughters.
4 Data and Setting
Both the qualitative and quantitative data used in this paper were collected in the Kagera
Region. A predominantly rural area in the Northwestern part of Tanzania bordering Lake
Victoria to the East, Uganda to the North and Rwanda and Burundi to the West, see map in
Appendix A1. The population (about 2 million in 2002) is primarily engaged in agriculture
and, to some extend, trading. The agriculture is a mixture of food and cash crop production,
dominated by bananas and co¤ee in the North and by maize, sorghum and tobacco in the
South. For more detail, see De Weerdt (2007).
The data set used for estimation in this paper is unique. The Kagera Health and Devel-
opment Survey data is a long term panel based on household surveys with a time span of 13
years, the rst round of surveys were originally conducted in 1991-1994, (KHDS I) and then
again in 2004, (KHDS II). This time horizon is a particular advantage for studying the human
capital investment decision outlined in the portfolio model, which relies on the assumption
that households have completed their fertility decisions in order to get a good estimate of the
completed human capital investment decision, . It is when children are of school age that
the schooling decisions are likely to be made, but given the sequential nature of having chil-
dren, it is only possible to observe the nal  years later. The long time horizon is therefore
crucial, because it allows me to use 2004 information about the proportion of children with
a primary school degree, but 1991-1994 information about household characteristics relevant
when the human capital portfolio decision is actually made. In addition, the KHDS has an
explicit module with detailed information on migrant children. This is unusual for household
surveys, which normally only survey household members, then children living elsewhere are
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not included and generally not accounted for.
In 2005, Lassen and I supplemented the quantitative KHDS data with qualitative data
based on focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews from 12 of the 49 KHDS
villages, working with the team that collected the new round of KHDS data in 2004. The
main purpose of the qualitative data collection was to get a closer to an understanding of what
a¤ects the schooling decisions made by parents and whether they are inuenced by the future
prospects for their children, urban migration and expected level of remittances as well as old-age
dependency, inheritance rules and social norms. Issues, which to some extend can be tested for
quantitatively, but where qualitative conrmation is reassuring. A typical focus group session
had a duration of three and a half hours including a break and included approximately ten
villagers with some knowledge of schooling, comprising all adult age groups and both men
and women, selected in cooperation with the village leader (an elected local) and the village
executive o¢ cer (appointed by the central government, not local). All sessions were conducted
with the same facilitator and the same note taker, and reporting procedures were set up so as to
ensure a uniform reporting across villages. Survey instruments and outcomes are documented
in Lassen and Lilleør (2005).
4.1 Data and Sample Selection
The data from the Kagera Health and Development Survey consists of ve waves. The rst four
waves were conducted with 6 months interval from 1991 to 1994 covering 915 households in to-
tal. All individual household members from the rst four waves were attempted re-interviewed
in a fth wave in 2004, (Beegle, DeWeerdt, and Dercon (2006))13. This implied tracking each
individual, even if they moved out of the village, region or country. The tracking in KHDS
2004 is exceptional with a re-interview rate of 91% of the surviving baseline households from
KHDS 1991-94, and an overall re-interview rate of 82% of the surviving household members14,
(Beegle, DeWeerdt, and Dercon (2006)). For the selected sample of households used below, the
re-interview rate among the surviving children is almost 93%. Slightly more than 8% of the
children in these households die between KHDS I and KHDS II.
The sample selection is based on the following critera. Only rural households with children
of the head or his/her spouse are included, and at least one of these children must be of school
age in wave 1. I dene primary school age to be between 7-17 years old, allowing for the
widespread delayed enrolment. Households must be interviewed both in the rst wave and in
the fth wave, but there are no requirements of survey participation in the three intermediate
13KHDS I was undertaken by the World Bank and e Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences, whereas
KHDS II was funded by DANIDA and World Bank and implemented by E.D.I. (Economic Development Initia-
tives) in Kagera.
14A household is characterised as re-interviewed when at least one member of the baseline household is re-
interviewed in 2004.
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waves. This means that all households will have at least one child aged between 20-30 years
old in 2004, who typically has a group of siblings. None of these siblings are allowed to be
younger than 7 years old in 2004, this is to avoid including households which may not yet have
completed their fertility and schooling decisions. The nal sample is 370 households15.
Since it is the long time horizon, rather than the dynamics of the panel as such, that are
of importance for taking the model to the data, it is worth making a note on the exact use of
the data. Basically, I create a pseudo cross-section, where variables relating to children and
their education (i.e. measures of N and ) are based on 2004 information, whereas variables
relating to the schooling decision, such as educational expenditures and household income (i.e.
measures of ea; eb and Y1) are based on averages from the pooled 1991-94 data. The ve waves
are thus collapsed to one, where the variable values are either an average over time of the
rst four waves, or 2004 values. To get the most exact measure of completed fertility and the
completed human capital investment decisions, N and , I include educational information
on the dead and the untraced children using the latest information available in KHDS I. This
way, attrition is virtually nil among children of participating households.
Finally, it should be noted that KHDS was collected as a two-stage stratied random sample,
based on geography and on mortality risk within the household. Since one of the main purposes
of the KHDS was to analyse the e¤ect of fatal adult illness on remaining household members,
there was a strong oversampling of sickhouseholds. A sickhousehold is dened as a household
where at least one adult is ill and unable to work or where there has been recent adult mortality
of anyone between 15-50 years of age in the 12 months preceding the enumeration interview. A
total of 16 households were sampled in each cluster, 14 of these where sickhouseholds. Such
a heavy stratication calls for careful consideration in any estimation analysis. However, if
the stratication is based on variables exogenous to the question of interest, it can be ignored
in the sense that any M-estimator will still produce consistent estimates and inference is still
valid, (Deaton (1998), Wooldridge (2002)). I return to this below in section 5.4.
4.2 The Local Setting of Final Sample
By 2004, the households included in the nal sample have an average of 8.2 children and 67.4 %
of these have completed or are attending primary school. There are roughly the same number
of sons and daughters and, on average, they are being equally educated in terms of schooling.
The intra-household proportions of children with formal education is given by the total number
of children who have completed primary school or are still attending primary school divided by
the total number of children of the household. I include children that have died, if they were
15The household attrition rate is 4.7%, or 18 of the households which full the sample selection criteria are
not re-interviewed in 2004. These households are in general smaller, with fewer children, less land, but slightly
higher expenditure levels. Household heads are younger and with less schooling than the average in the sample.
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at least 7 years of age at time of death. They are included both in the fertility measure and
the portfolio measure using the latest schooling information available.
Households in Kagera have many children. 5% of the sample have more than 16 children,
and typically their fathers have more than one wife. I drop any household with more than
25 children to avoid that these households are driving the empirical results. This reduces the
sample by 1.5% to 365 households.
In the early 1990s, the sample households had average daily expenditure levels per adult
equivalent of 0.37 USD, well below the global poverty line of 1 USD/day. An alternative
measure of how tightly the liquidity constraint may be binding, is the food share out of total
household expenditure, which on average was 66%. The households owned slightly more than
2 hectares of land, and almost a quarter of them had a small herd of cattle, sheep, goats or
pigs. Income source diversication is not just a matter for future risk management, but also
happened to a large extent at present in early 1990s. The questionaire allows for six di¤erent
sources of income: agricultural income, wage income, self-employment business income, rental
income, transfers and other non-labour income. More than 90% of the households had at least
three sources of income. All households had agricultural income and most households also have
rental income and income from transfers, typically remittances. 20% of the households have
income from non-agricultural self-employment and 40% from wage employment.
Household heads were on average 50 years old and slightly more than a third of them had
a primary school degree. During a period of 12 months, 30% of the migrant children of the
village had sent remittances, and around 20% of migrant children have succeeded in nding
wage employment. The Kagera region is predominantly inhabited by Haya people. The tribal
fractionalisation index is therefore also relatively low with a value of 0.2. Households lived in
villages with almost 4000 inhabitants on average, and where the average distance to the local
primary school was less than 2 km. The annual school fee was 40 cents, but school uniforms
were considerably more expensive and averaged more than 4 USD. Class sizes were 50 students
and generally there were 3-4 students per text book. Almost 70% of the teachers had either a
grade A or grade B degree. These latter variables will be used as school quality controls in
the regression analyses below.
[Table 4.1]
5 Empirical Estimates
Before continuing to the empirical analysis and tests of model implications, the validity of model
assumptions are reviewed in section 5.1. The choice of the econometric model is discussed in
section 5.2 and the empirical analysis of model implications is in section 5.3. In section 5.4,
robustness checks of the model are carried out.
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5.1 Testing model assumptions
The rst assumption, that urban income levels are higher than agricultural income levels in
expectation, and likewise for the spreads, is easily conrmed by looking at the means and
standard deviations for household expenditure levels in rural and urban areas. As it is most
commonly done, I use expenditure measures as proxies for lifetime income levels, as they
are subject to less uctuations and probably also smaller measurement errors.16 The KHDS
expenditure measure includes an estimate of the consumption of home-produced goods, which
is an important component of any agricultural household food consumption. A simple one-sided
t-test, where the alternative is that urban expenditure levels are higher than the corresponding
rural levels, easily rejects the null of equality at 1% level. Likewise for the di¤erence in standard
deviations. The rst assumption of yb2 < y
a
2 and "
b > "a thus cannot be rejected in the data.
Again, this is not to say that the uncertainty associated with agricultural income is negligible.
There is lots of uncertainty associated with agricultural production. However, income shocks
may be more temporary than in the urban sector, reducing the overall spread in agricultural
income compared to urban income. The important, but untested, assumption is that the
uncertainties associated with each of the two sectors are uncorrelated.
The second assumption that parents rely on their children for old-age support, is an as-
sumption based on the ndings of the fertility literature17. This is supported by the qualitative
ndings described above. Children are always mentioned as the rst and most important source
of old-age support, followed by fellow clan-members and villagers if the elderly owns assets to
leave as inheritance in return for the assistance. A quick look at the KHDS I data, conrms the
heavy dependence on children in old-age. Out of the roughly 200 individuals in KHDS I, who
are 70 years of age or older, at least 60% live with their children and at least 92% either live
with their children or have at some point during the 18 months interval of the survey received
remittances directly from their children or from the households of their children. Combined
with the ndings of the qualitative data, this is a good indicator that also children in Kagera,
as it has been found elsewhere, are important sources of old-age security for their parents.
The model assumption is thus consistent with both qualitative and quantitative ndings in the
data.
The third assumption of a sectoral divide in the returns to formal and traditional educa-
tion may at rst glance seem controversial. However, here it is important to keep the local
setting in mind. With an agricultural production system based on traditional methods and
indigenous knowledge about the local agricultural cycle, the transfer of farm specic human
16Deaton (1998) notes that survey-based estimates of income are often substantially less than the survey-
based estimates of consumption(p.30), suggesting a strong underestimation of savings. Furthermore, for the
large number of households that are involved in agriculture or in family business, personal and business incoming
and outgoings are likely to be confused. This complicates the measure of income even further.
17See Lilleør (2008) for a review of the fertility literature and the role of intergenerational transfers.
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capital from parents to children is important. In particularly so, as long as more complex
modern agricultural technologies are unavailable or beyond the nancial reach of a subsistence
farmer. The literature on agricultural production and returns to specic versus general hu-
man capital shows this distinction very clearly. A key contribution in this area is Rosenzweig
(1995). He argues that when the agricultural production technology is simple, schooling does
not increase productivity. Returns to formal education are only positive, when new advanced
technologies are introduced, creating an environment for productive learning opportunities,
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) and Rosenzweig (1996))18. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999)
and Jolli¤e (2004) conrm the ndings by Rosenzweig of low or no returns when agricultural
technologies are simple. They use data from rural Pakistan and rural Ghana, respectively, and
show, that on-farm returns to education are low, while o¤-farm returns to schooling can be
quite high. It should be noted that although the notion of no return to formal schooling in
traditional agriculture and no returns to traditional agricultural education through learning-
by-doing in the formal urban sector is not common in the child labour literature, it is also not
new. Fafchamps and Wahba (2006) operate with a similar set-up and nd strong indications of
returns to learning-by-doing of, what they term, subsistence workin the agricultural sector.
Taking a very crude look at the KHDS I data, there are some indications that also in Kagera
there exists a sectoral divide in the returns to traditional and formal education. Figure 5.1
shows a non-parametric polynomial t between average years of formal education among adult
male household members and agricultural and non-agricultural income19, respectively. Income
measures are in logarithmic terms and per adult equivalent per day. There is a strong positive
correlation between years of formal education and non-agricultural income levels, and virtually
no correlation between years of formal education and agricultural income levels.
[Figure 5.1: adult males schooling and income]
When slicing the data slightly di¤erent and comparing the level of formal education among
adult males in the bottom and top deciles of the agricultural and non-agricultural income
distributions, respectively, the same nding emerges. There is no signicant di¤erence in the
level of education among the bestand the worst farming households measure in terms of
agricultural income, both have an average of 5 years of formal education among adult males.
There is, however, a signicant di¤erence of 2.3 years of formal education among the top and
the bottom decile of the non-agricultural income distribution, where the bottom decile hosts
males with an average of 4.5 years of formal education, compared to an average of 6.8 years of
18An example of this is the introduction of high-yielding variety seeds under the Green Revolution in India,
where Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) nd increasing returns to primary education during periods of technical
progress, but low or no returns otherwise.
19Non-agricultural income is here the sum of wage income and business income from non-agricultural self-
employment.
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education in the top decile of the non-agricultural income distribution. Looking at the crude
and partial correlation coe¢ cients in data and testing for their signicance level similar ndings
emerge, see table 5.1
Table 5.1. Correlation coe¢ cient between years of formal education and income levels.
av. years of formal education Agri.income Non-agri. income
...among adult males in HH no controls 0.01 0.25***
w/ controls 0.00 0.10***
...among adult females in HH no controls 0.04** 0.30***
w/ controls 0.02* 0.10***
Note: *10%, **5%, ***1% signicance levels. Income measure are in logarithmic term, per adult equivalent per day.
Partial correlation coe¢ cients are from pooled OLS regression of income on years of adult female and male schooling, as
well as a number of controls, such as HH size, number of adult males and females, land, cattle, BMI, age, weight, and
tribal a¢ liation.
Although the above ndings are based on simple correlations in the data without any
controls for selection issues or labour supply, they are consistent with the assumption of a
sectoral divide in returns to schooling. There is an overall indication of positive correlation
between more years of schooling and higher non-agricultural income levels, but much less so for
agricultural income. These quantitative ndings are conrmed by the qualitative ones, where,
in particular, elderly respondents emphasised the lack of agricultural skills among primary and
secondary school graduates. At a question of whether someone with an education is always
better o¤ than someone without, it was reported that "one old man opposed saying the one
with primary education wastes their time at school instead of learning real life at home When
they return to learning how to farm their fellows who did not go to school are far ahead",
(Cluster 2). In another cluster, when asked whether primary school is a risky investment,
it was noted that "In case a child returns to weeding a farm it is a loss, then it is a risk
investment", (Cluster 13), implying that students of primary schools only know enough about
farming to be able to weed. Although the latter comment would imply negative returns to
schooling in agriculture, the model only assumes no returns to formal education in agriculture,
which seems to be consistent with the data.
5.2 Choice of econometric model
The optimal portfolio allocation of children between formal and traditional education,  is
by construction a variable censored at 0 and at 1. I have therefore chosen to estimate the
reduced form for  of the portfolio model using a two-sided censored Tobit regression. For each
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individual household i the optimal portfolio choice can then be described as
i = 
0xi+ui
where i is the latent variable. Although it might be optimal, in terms of the model, for the
parents sometimes to choose values outside this range, it is not feasible. xi contains each of
the observable model variables, N;Y1; eb; p as well as a set of controls for household and village
characteristics, and ui is a normally distributed homoskedastic error term, ui  N(0; 2): .
Given the censoring of i ; I observe the following in the data
i = 0; if i  0
i = 

i ; if 0 < 

i < 1
i = 1; if i  1
The double-sided Tobit log-likelihood function for each household is given then
lnLi =
X
i=0
ln

0  0xi


+
X
0<i<1
1



i   0xi


+
X
i=1
ln

1  

1  0xi


The model is estimated using robust standard errors allowing for correlation within villages.
However, consistent estimates of the -coe¢ cients in the Tobit model are subject to a set of
assumptions.  should have characteristics of a random normal variable, which means that
(i) the uncensored  must be a continuous variable, and (ii) the error term ui must be both
normally distributed and homoskedastic. Unfortunately, if these assumptions are not fullled,
the coe¢ cient estimates may be inconsistent.
Given the somewhat discrete nature of ; an obvious alternative to the Tobit model is a
binomial count model. The dependent variable is then no longer the proportion of formally
educated children, but rather the number of formally educated children, N b = N out of the
total number of children in the household, N: N b is assumed to be binomially distributed and
should be thought of as a sum of independent and homogenous Bernoulli-trials up until N .
It is possible to relax the, in this setting, very restrictive assumptions of homogeneity and
independence among siblings, by estimating the model using quasi-maximum likelihood. In
section 5.4 , I will return to these robustness checks of the preferred reduced form specication.
5.3 Testing model implications
There are two groups of model implications, those relating to model assumptions and the stan-
dard human capital investment aspect without uncertainty, and those relating to uncertainty
about returns and thus the human capital portfolio aspect. All implications are important
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for the model conclusions, but only by testing the implications relating to the latter group
will it be possible to say anything about the importance of the portfolio e¤ect relative to the
constraint e¤ect.
5.3.1 Model implications irrespective of uncertainty
There are three implictaions relating to the model and its assumptions, but which are not in any
way a consequence of uncertainty about future returns. First, if formal education is indeed more
protable than traditional education, the model predicts a positive e¤ect of parental income
on  for households where the liquidity constraint is binding in the human capital investment
decision. Second, if parents base their expectations about second period remittances from
migrant children (p) on the current proportion of remitting migrant children in the village, this
proportion should have a positive inuence on the optimal choice of : This is suggested by
the qualitative ndings, where jealousywas a motivational factor for educating children in
the sense that if parents perceive that other educated children from the village are doing well
and remitting home, this will increase the current demand for schooling in the village. Parents
want their own children to do as well as other children. This implication, however, also hinges
upon the assumption of a sectoral divide in the returns to formal and traditional education. If
remitting children were mostly traditionally educated, the e¤ect should be negative. Third, a
more direct implication of the sectoral divide in returns to formal and traditional education is
the global non-monotonicity between agricultural income and the optimal portfolio allocation
of children to formal education. That is, there should be a negative e¤ect of high agricultural
income levels on , due to the relative shift in protability between traditional and formal
education. These three implications are tested in the reduced form of the Tobit -regresssions
in table 5.2.
[Table 5.2]
Model (1) in table 5.2 is the most basic reduced form regression for : It includes measures
of or proxies for the available key model variables, N;Y1; eb; and p; as well as a controls for
household characteristica (age and education of household head, proportion of daughters, and
household size excluding the number of children), and controls for school quality (number of
students per math book and per Kiswahili book, proportion of teachers with grade A and grade
B diploma, and class size).
Looking at the rst column for all children, there is a positive and highly signicant portfolio
e¤ect of the number of children, N on  and a positive e¤ect of household expenditure (which
is a proxy for Y1), indicating the existence of a liquidity constraint. However, when splitting
the sample by sons and daughters, the liquidity constraint only seems to bind for daughters,
whereas the portfolio e¤ect is clearly only dominant among the sons, as the qualitative ndings
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suggest it should be if the portfolio model is valid. This seems to be a strong result in favour
of the portfolio model above, which I will analyse in more detail in section 5.3 below.
The comparison of model (1) and model (2) is included for one reason. In model (1), there
is a positive and signicant e¤ect of the village proportion of migrant children remitting to their
parents, which is clearly driven by the sons as it should be according to the model predictions.
However, this e¤ect disappears completely when controls for the tribal composition and the
fractionalisation index within the village are included. This should come as no surprise. These
tribal controls are strongly signicant and, as Lassen and I discuss in Lassen and Lilleør (2008),
highly correlated with the probability of children remitting home. We nd indications that the
reason for this is a positive correlation between tribal homogeneity and the strength of social
norms, and thus family control, within the village. Schooling expenditure is measured both
in terms of average school distance within the village, school fees and uniform costs. There
is a negative e¤ect of the school distance, which is strong for sons in model (2). Despite the
school quality controls not being jointly signicant, they are still included because they are
closely correlated with the school fee. Even so, the school fee still has a positive e¤ect on the
proportion of daughters in school.20
The positive e¤ects of the proxies for both Y1 and p; together with the ndings of gure
5.1 and table 5.1 above, give some indications of the possible existence of a sectoral divide
in the returns to schooling. The most direct implication is, however, the predicted inverse U
relationship between  and Y1, see model (3). When including the quadratic term of household
expenditure, both the linear and the quadratic terms are strongly signicant with the expected
opposite signs. The negative e¤ect of high agricultural income on  starts at the turning
point of the inverse U, which for sons is at Y1 = 0:99 USD in model (3) and in model (4),
the latter includes wealth controls. This is in the neighbourhood of the 98th percentile of the
expenditure distribution for rural households, and thus within sample range. For daughters
the turning point is at Y1 = 1:13 in model (3) and at Y1 = 1:17 in model (4). The latter
turning point is almost outside the range of the expenditure distribution, only two households
have expenditure levels higher than 1.17 USD per adult equivalent per day. This can be an
indication of girls being more subject to liquidity constraints than boys, and/or of uncertainty
being more important in the optimal schooling decision for boys than for girls, as suggested by
the portfolio model.
As a robustness check, model (3) is re-estimated without the top 5% of the expenditure
distribution to ensure that the inverse U shape is not purely driven by one or two outliers,
and the results are even stronger and more signicant. The turning points move inward to the
70th and 88th percentile of the expenditure distribution for sons and daughters, respectively.
In a similar spirit, I have used the quadratic of log expenditure. The qualitative results are the
20A similar positive e¤ect for all children and for sons disappears after inclusion of school quality controls.
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same, although the signicance levels are somewhat lower. Overall, it seems safe to conclude
that the inverse U shape between Y1 and  predicted by the assumption of a sectoral divide in
formal and traditional education is consistent with the data.
Finally, it should be mentioned, that the results are robust to several di¤erent model spec-
ications. Controls for land, livestock, the use of agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and
irrigation, the existence of road for motorised vehicles in the village, population size of village
and whether or not the village has a daily market have all been included without a¤ecting the
remaining model coe¢ cients signicantly, see model (4).
5.3.2 Model implications of uncertainty
There are three empirical implications of the model which all are direct implications of the
existence of uncertainty about future return to human capital. The key empirical implication
is the possible dominance of a positive portfolio e¤ect over a negative constraint e¤ect of higher
N on . The null hypothesis is that the portfolio e¤ect exists and is strong enough to gener-
ate a positive e¤ect of the total number of children on the optimal proportion of children in
school. Despite only being an indirect test of uncertainty, it is a clear unambiguous empirical
implication of the model. A positive e¤ect of N on  can only be due to the existence of uncer-
tainty and thus a need to ensure future income diversication in the human capital portfolio
allocation. It was already clear from table 5.2 that the positive portfolio e¤ect does indeed
dominate the negative resource constraint e¤ect for sons, but not for daughters, as suggested
by the qualitative results. Since this is the most central result of the model implications and
the empirical analysis, let me go into its details.
The calibration results show that in case of liquidity constraints or perfectly correlated
uncertainty measures, the positive e¤ect will only dominate for low numbers of N because
either the liquidity constraint starts to bind for higher numbers of N and/or the N" spread
becomes too large when migrant children are perfectly correlated. This suggests allowing for
a quadratic term in N and thereby being able to capture a possible negative e¤ect for high N
on : Table 5.3 shows the linear and quadratic N models for sons, model (4) and model (5)
respectively, as well as the quadratic N model for daughters, model (6).
[Table 5.3]
The quadratic N terms in model (5) are both highly signicant and with the expected signs.
The negative constraint or correlation e¤ect only starts to dominate the positive portfolio e¤ect
of the total number of sons on their optimal proportion in school,  when there are more than
ten sons in the household. Almost 97% of households have ten sons or less. To ensure that this
is not solely driven by the choice of functional form, I have tested the quadratic specication
in N against a fully exible non-parameteric specication using indicator variables for N = 2
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up to N = 12: A likelihood ratio test cannot reject that the quadratic specication is nested
within the exible non-parametric specication. This strong positive e¤ect of the total number
of sons is surprisingly close to the scenario of no liquidity constraint and no correlation in the
uncertainty measure for migrant children illustrated in the calibration gure 3.2 above. Figure
5.2 below shows the raw mean of  for each N (the unconnected dots), a non-parametric t of
 on N using a Kernel weighted local mean smoothing function and its 95% condence interval
(dark blue line and shaded area), and the predicted value of  from model (5) are all shown
in gure 5.2. below. The inverse U shape in the relation between total number of sons and the
proportion of them being formally educated is clear, and the predicted value for  from the
quadratic N model (5) ts comfortably within the condence interval of the nonparametric t
of  on N .
[Figure 5.2]
However, the estimation of a quadratic relationship between N and  for the sons in model
(5) comes at a cost. The inverse U e¤ects from the quadratic expenditure specication disappear
when the level of agricultural income is proxied by household expenditure. This is despite the
fact that these two inverse U relationships are caused by opposite e¤ects. The negative e¤ect of
a high number of sons is due to liquidity constraints, whereas the negative e¤ect of high levels
of expenditure is the opposite, the agricultural sector is now more attractive. If instead I use
the non-food share of household expenditure as a proxy for disposable income in the household
both quadratic terms survive, although they are now weaker for daughters. The negative e¤ect
of high disposable income among starts dominating around the 80th percentile for sons, see
model (9).
While the positive portfolio e¤ect of number sons should exist, but not necessarily dom-
inate, for everyone, the negative e¤ect of the quadratic term for number of sons should only
exist for households which are liquidity constrained or where the urban income uncertainty
is highly correlated among migrant children. Ignoring the latter, and thus assuming that the
negative part is only driven by liquidity constraints, this would imply that among households,
which are unlikely to be liquidity constrained, the positive e¤ect should dominate the negative
e¤ect over the full range of N: That is, there should be no negative quadratic e¤ect for this
subset of households. This can be tested by comparing those households who are less likely to
be liquidity constrained with the rest. Assuming that the liquidity constraint does not bind
for the top quartile of the expenditure distribution, I dene this group to be a HiEXP group.
Model (7) corresponds to model (5), but now allowing for interaction terms between the func-
tional form for number of sons (N +N2) and an indicator variable for whether the household
belonged to the HiEXP group in KHDS I. Now both the quadratic terms for number of sons
and the household expenditure are strengthened and signicant with the expected signs. But,
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the HiEXP interaction terms are all insignicant, including the quadratic interaction. Unfor-
tunately this does not tell us much, the insignicance can easily be due to sample size problems
or it can be because there simply is no signicant di¤erence between the two groups. There
are 85 households in the top quartile of the expenditure distribution. Taking a graphical look
at the data, there is some indication, that sample size might cause the insignicance. Figure
5.3 corresponds to gure 5.2, but now the the predicted values for  are predicted for each of
the two subgroups, HiEXp = 0 and HiEXP=1.
[Figure 5.3]
The negative liquidity constraint e¤ect clearly dominates the positive portfolio e¤ect for
lowerN among the lower 75% of the expenditure distribution compared to the top quartile. The
inverse U relationship is virtually absent from the HiEXP group, as the portfolio model would
predict. Estimating model (5) without the top quartile of the expenditure distribution predicts
a turning point of the quadratic N relationship at eight sons, the liquidity constraint starts
binding earlier than in the full model (5), where the turning point was ten sons. Similarly, the
turning point for the quadratic Y1 relationship is also lower (now 0.31 USD), corresponding to
the median household. This could be an indication of households in the bottom three quartiles
facing higher levels of uncertainty about future income transfers than the richer households of
the top quartile, see model (8).
Second, for the model to be of any relevance it is necessary that the overall school enrolment
rate is primarily driven by less than full enrolment within households, rather than being a result
of averaging over corner solution between households. This is clearly the case. More than 70
per cent of the households have uncensored enrolment rates between 0 and 1, almost 20 per
cent of the households are censored at  = 1 and the remaining are censored at  = 0: For sons
and daughters, separately, the numbers are slightly higher with approximately 50 per cent of
the households being uncensored. This is no surprise as the number of forced corner solutions
is higher due to more observations with only one son or one daughter in the household. There
is no signicant di¤erence between the censored and uncensored household enrolment rates, all
are close to 0.65.
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Table 5.4 Household primary school enrolment rates
Mean  # HHs % HHs
Uncensored HHs 0.64 278 72.58
Censored HHs 0.67 105 27.42
All HHs 0.65 383 100.00
The nal testable empirical implication of the portfolio model is the gender di¤erence. The
model should only apply to sons. If the relations above were all spurious, one should expect
no di¤erence between sons and daughters. The data tells a di¤erent story. Throughout results
have been di¤erent by gender in the expected direction. Model (6), which is the quadratic N
model for daughters only, conrms this once again. The model is estimated to ensure that the
insignicance of the linear term of N was not due to misspecication of the functional form.
Including a quadratic term does not alter the conclusion, there is no e¤ect of the total number
of daughters on the proportion of daughters which have received formal education. Not only
are the coe¢ cients insignicatnt, they are also jointly signicantly di¤erent from those of sons
at a 1% signicance level. There has been a signicantly negative e¤ect of the proportion
of daughter in the household throughout. This could be capturing some of the e¤ect of the
number daughters. Leaving out the variable controlling for the proportion of daughters in
the household, the e¤ect the number of daughters is negative and only signicant at a 20%
level. The combination of the lack of a positive portfolio e¤ect of number of daughters on
their optimal proportion in school and the strong dominance of the positive e¤ect of household
expenditure indicates that the human capital investment decision of the girls is largely inu-
enced by resource constraints within the household, but not by the need for risk diversication.
Although daughters are perceived as more loving as suggested by the ethnographic evidence,
this perception is probably inuenced by the fact that they are not expected to remit. This
goes hand in hand with the quantitative nding in the data, that daughters are found to be
more likely to remit, but their level of remittances is substantially below that their brothers.
In the ethnographic evidence, it was often mentioned that daughetrs would remit in terms of
gifts to their mothers (bars of soap, a dress), whereas sons remit cash to fathers.
Overall, it seems safe to conclude that the model implications and assumptions are consis-
tent with the data. There are strong indications of positive portfolio e¤ects for lower numbers
of sons, although negative constraint e¤ects seem to dominate for larger numbers of sons.
There are also some, although not as strong, indications of the sectoral divide in returns to
formal versus traditional education actually keeping children out of school if parents are doing
relatively well in the agricultural sector. The negative e¤ect of higher levels of expenditure
tend to come into e¤ect sooner for sons than for daughters, which is in line with the portfolio
model suggesting that the more the optimal portfolio allocation  is a¤ected by uncertainty,
the sooner the negative e¤ect of higher agricultural incomes will start dominating. Since the
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optimal portfolio allocation of sons is sensitive to uncertainty, whereas that of daughters is not,
such a result is exacly what should be expected. The gender di¤erences thus come into play at
di¤erent levels.
5.4 Robustness Checks
The empirical specication, which most closely resembles the portfolio model, is the quadratic
N and Y1 model (5) in table 5.3 for sons. To have a rough idea of how well the econometric
model does in terms of tting the data, please refer to gure 5.4 below. It shows the actual 
for sons and the associated predicted probabilities.
[Figure 5.4]
As mentioned above in section 5.1, the Tobit estimates are only consistent when the as-
sumptions of normality and homoskedasticity of the error term u are fullled. In the following,
I will look into these assumptions as well as check the robustness of the key results of model (5)
by using alternative estimation methods. Table 5.5 below includes model (5) for comparison
and a number of alternative econometric models.
The rst alternative is a Tobit model estimation allowing for a specic functional form of
heteroskedasticity, V ar(ujx) = 2 exp(z), where z is a subset of the explanatory x variables,
model (10). In this specication z includes the total number of sons and log expenditure. More
general formulations have also been tested, where household size, total number of children, pro-
portion of daughters, school distance and the tribal fractionalisation index have been included,
but these variables are all insignicant in the heteroskedaticity estimation. A Hausman test for
equality of coe¢ cients of the two Tobit models, where the model (5) is e¢ cient and consistent
under the null, and model (10) is consistent under both the null and the alternative hypothesis,
is rejected. So is a likelihood ratio test of model (5) being nested in model (10). Even though
there is indication of heteroskedasticity and a considerable drop in signicance levels in model
(10) compared to model (5), the main nding of a positive portfolio e¤ect among the sons
seems to be hold. However, as Deaton (1998) point out, it is somewhat arbitrary what to use
as explanatory variables in the heteroskedasticity function and what to use in the regression
function. This can result in situations where the coe¢ cients in the heteroskedasticity function
are estimated consistently, but those of the regression function are not. This method should
therefore be used with caution. A comparison of model (10a) and model (10b) also show that
including a di¤erent set of regressors in the heteroskedasticity function change the coe¢ cient
estimates.
The second assumption of the Tobit model is normality of the error terms. A possible way of
testing the appropriateness of the Tobit model is thus to compare its estimates with estimates
from models, which do not assume normality. In the censored setting, Powells censored Least
34
Absolute Deviation estimator, which is based on an assumption of the conditional median
Med(ujx) = 0, rather than the conditional mean E(ujx) = 0, is a typical choice. This estimator
is consistent both for non-normal and heteroskedastic error terms. However, it only allows for
one-sided censoring. The model is not very well estimated for two reasons, only being able to
allow one-sided censoring I choose to enforce the upper censoring which has most data points.
Second, in order to achieve convergence, the tribal controls have to be left out. Regression
results are shown in the column of model (11), purely as a robustness check of the Tobit model.
The coe¢ cient estimates and their bootstrapped standard errors are generally all of the same
magnitude.
Both the Tobit model and the Powells median estimator requires a continuous dependent
variable. Although households in Kagera have many children, the continuity of  can be
debated. An alternative robustness check is therefore to estimate the same model, but now as
a binomial count model as mentioned above in section 5.1. The results of such an estimation
are shown as model (12), standard errors are robust and cluster corrected. The signs and
signicance levels indicate that results are clearly in line with the above ndings. Finally, a
standard linear probability model has been estimated using ordinary least squared, again with
robust and cluster corrected standard errors, see model (13). The OLS estimates should be
scaled with the proportion of uncensored variables in the sample for better comparison with the
Tobit estimates of model (5), as suggested by Greene (1981)21. For the sons, 50% of households
have uncensored values of  which implies multiplying the OLS coe¢ cients with 2. Again, both
magnitudes and signicance levels are comparable to those of the Tobit model. Thus, despite
possible problems of non-normality and heteroskedasticity, it seems safe to conclude that the
results are robust to the choice of econometric model.
[Table 5.5]
Another robustness check has to be done with respect to the heavy stratication in the
data sampling between sickand wellhouseholds. In the empirical analysis above, the sam-
ple stratication is assumed exogenous to the human capital investment decision. There are
di¤erent reasons to think that this is not the case. The data collection was done with a focus
on oversampling of possible HIV infected household. Investment decisions for better old-age
security are likely to be altered if life expectancy either of the parents or of the children changes
dramatically. This would then also inuence the optimal human capital portfolio allocation
within the household. Estevan and Baland (2007) argue that high mortality rates among adult
children can generate enough uncertainty for parents to alter their human capital investment
21Wooldridge (2002) has a similar suggestion for checking the appropriateness of a Tobit by comparing the
scaled Tobit coe¢ cient estimates with those of a probit. The Tobit estimates should be scaled with estimated ,
(Wooldridge (2002):p.534). Such an eyeball comparison yields similar results; magnitudes, signs and signicance
levels are reasonably close.
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decision, but they do not test this hypothesis in the data. There is in general only sparse
empirical evidence on this issue. Using KHDS I data, Burke and Beegle (2004) nd no e¤ect
of the death of parent on the total number of hours in school for boys or girls. Although, using
KHDS I & II, Beegle, DeWeerdt, and Dercon (2005) nd some indication of a negative impact
on the long run level of educational attainment of orphans, but primarily so for children not
already enrolled at the time of death of the parent. In my nal sample of 365 households, only
40 households are classied as well. Only very crude test of di¤erence between the two groups
have therefore been done. Simple t-test of di¤erences in , N , or Y1 for all children, sons only
and daughters only cannot show any signicant di¤erence between the two groups. Including
a wellindicator variable and interaction terms with N and Y1 in -regressions for model (4)
and (6) show no signicant di¤erence between the two groups. Due to the heavy oversampling
of sickhouseholds, the empirical results of this paper may therefore represent a lower bound
in terms of schooling.
Finally, it should be mentioned that results are robust to sample selection. Inclusion of
households with more than 25 children or with children under the age of 7 in 2004 only
strengthens the results further, so does truncating the total number of sons and daughters,
respectively, at 12.
6 Alternative Explanations
The positive quadratic portfolio e¤ect for sons is the key result of the empirical ndings pro-
viding support for the hypothesis that future income uncertainty generates a need for human
capital diversication. Hence, an obvious question is what else could result in a positive e¤ect
of the number of sons on their intra-household schooling rate?
There are three possible explanations, which can all yield a positive e¤ect of N on . First,
rural households could choose, for which ever reason, always to keep one son at home, who
is destined for taking over the family farm once adult. Such a hypothesis has very accurate
predictions for the value of  for each N , see gure 5.5 below. It is clear from this gure,
that the hypothesis has some value compared to the non-parametric t and its condence
interval. However, the one-son-behind hypothesis seems to underpredict for small N and, more
importantly, overpredict when there are many sons in the household. The one-son-behind
hypothesis is not able to capture the negative quadratic e¤ect of large N on : A raw F-test
from a simple Tobit model of  regressed only on indicator variables for the number of sons in
the household rejects that the estimated coe¢ cients equal (N   1)=N: Likewise, if the positive
e¤ect of N on  in model (4) is purely driven by the one-son-hypothesis, there should be
no statistically signicant di¤erence between the connected gray dots and the yellow ones in
gure 5.5 over N: This can be tested by deducting e = (N   1)=N from the actual  and
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then testing for any remaining explanatory power of N in a    e tobit regression, where the
censoring limits now are (-1 + 1=N) and (1=N), for the lower and upper limit respectively:
Likelihood ratio tests against both the quadratic and the non-parametric functional form of N
both reject the one-son-behind hypothesis, indicating that it is indeed not able to capture the
non-monotonicity in the data.
[Figure 5.5]
The second alternative explanation is closely related. If there are diminishing returns in
agriculture it might not be feasible to have more than one son taking over the family farm, it
would therefore require additional land for any other son also being educated traditionally. The
one-son-behind hypothesis is thus comparable to an explanation of strong diminishing returns
to labour in agriculture, in the sense that the family farm cannot feed more than the family
of one son. However, an explanation based on strong diminishing returns have to be coupled
with local land scarcity, making it di¢ cult or very expensive to acquire new land for the second
or third son destined for agriculture. The KHDS data contain a community level variable of
whether people in the village buy or sell land, however the measure changes dramatically over
the rst four waves, despite the very short time span. In the rst wave, it is stated that only
in 53% of the villages land is bought and sold, in wave 4 the number is almost 80%. Using the
variable as an indirect measure of land scarcity22 has no signicant direct e¤ect on  in model
(4), nor does it a¤ect the positive e¤ect of N when introduced as an interaction term. However,
the instrument might be weak given the large variation over time. A more appropriate measure
of land scarcity is needed, in order to test the e¤ect of land scarcity on  and on the    N
relation properly. Furthermore, with strong diminishing returns  will never start dropping
again for high levels of N: This explanation can therefore not capture the quadratic relationship
between  and N found in the data. The qualitative data also give some hints on this matter.
The issue of schooling versus the right to a plot of land was clearly an issue much debated
during the focus group discussions. It was noted repeatedly that children have rights to one of
the two, sometimes both. It was thus not uncommon for parents to acquire land, sometimes
with the assistance of the local village council, for future inheritance to their sons, or for parents
to split family plots between sons, if the size would make such a split feasible. Village councils
would indeed allocate new land plots upon reasonable requests. However, in the more ancient
villages23 land tends to be more scarce and the local village councils have no or less free land
to allocate. Although diminishing returns most likely are present and inuence the schooling
decision of the parents, it does not seem to be enough to explain what we are seeing.
22 If villagers never buy or sell land, it can imply that all land is inherited and therefore di¢ cult to come by
through other channels.
23That is villages, which existed prior to the Ujamaa villagization programme of President Nyerere in the late
1960s. The programme forced all rural households into (often new) villages with access to water and schools.
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Despite the fact that none of the above alternative explanations can be veried by the data,
they might still have some credit. However, for the one-son-behind hypothesis to be a useful
alternative explanation, the question still remains what the economic rationale behind it is. One
can easily imagine the rationale being precisely what this paper is about, risk diversication.
It should be emphasised though, that while both of the two alternative explanations can give
plausible reasons for the positive e¤ect of N on , they are not able also to explain the negative
quadratic e¤ect of N on , which is embedded in the portfolio model.
Finally, one might wonder whether child heterogeneity or non-constant returns to scale
with respect to number of children and their education could generate a positive relationship
between N and : The model assumes both child homogeneity and constant returns to the
number of children being educated. I am thus disregarding the classic Becker argument of
a trade-o¤ between quantity and quality of children. If such a trade-o¤ exists, say because
parents have to spread their e¤orts over more children, it should result in decreasing returns to
the number of children being educated, and therefore predict a negative relationship between
N and : The question is then whether increasing returns to the number of children being
educated is a plausible explanation. This should result in the youngest of many brothers on
average doing better in the urban sector compared to the youngest of few brothers, everything
else equal. There are no indications of this in the data, a simple test of whether the youngest
out of maximum 4 sons compared to the youngest out of minimum 6 sons is less likely to be in
wage employment is rejected. There is no signicant di¤erence what so ever.
The question then is whether unobserved heterogeneity with respect to ability can generate
the inverse U relations between  and N . If all households sample from the same schooling
ability distribution, then child heterogenity cannot generate a positive relationship between
 and N . Only if households with more children sample from schooling ability distributions
with considerably higher means than households with fewer children, could child heterogeneity
generate such a positive relationship between  and N: This would require modelling N as
endogenous such that households drawing high ability children among the rst borns realise
that they are drawing from a good ability distribution and therefore decide to have more
children, whereas households drawing from bad ability distributions stop their fertility earlier.
First born migrant sons should therefore be more successful in the urban labour market due
to higher ability if they are from a large family rather than a small family. Again, there are
no indications of this being the case in the data. Furthermore, this cannot explain the gender
di¤erence. It is hard to imagine that draws from the ability distribution should depend on
gender.
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7 Conclusions & Policy Implications
In this paper, the emphasis has been on modelling the household human capital investment
decision jointly for all children and thereby allowing for sibling dependence, which goes beyond
the much debated sibling rivalry for scarce resources. A simple human capital portfolio model
is set up to analyse the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the optimal allocation of children
between formal and traditional education, that is between future urban and agricultural in-
come. Not surprisingly, it is easy to show analytically that as uncertainty about future income
increases, risk averse parents will tend to diversify their human capital investments in children
in order to diversify future income sources. This is a standard example of an ex-ante risk
management strategy, only in this paper applied to a di¤erent setting, the educational choice
of the children. It is not possible to get a credible measure of future uncertainty in data, and
therefore not possible to identify such an e¤ect directly. However, by calibrating the model
under di¤erent scenarios using data driven numerical values, I am able to derive very specic
model predictions for how sibling dependence due to portfolio e¤ects can be separated from
resource constraint e¤ects in the empirical analysis.
Empirically, there are two ndings, which provide strong support to the portfolio model.
First of all, I nd that positive portfolio e¤ects are remarkably strong for sons and clearly
dominate possible negative constraint e¤ects as long as the number of sons is not too high. In
households with many sons, the negative constraint e¤ects seem to dominate. This generates
a quadratic relationship between the number of sons in the household and the proportion of
them being educated formally. Second, there is no such nding for daughters. The anecdotal
evidence from the qualitative data on norms and expectations with respect to childrens role as
old-age security providers for their parents clearly supports the nding of a gender di¤erence
in the portfolio model. Norms dictate that parents can only ask for support from their sons
(and, if any, their unmarried daughters) in old age. The obligations of married daughters lie
solely with their families in law. There are, to the best of my knowledge, no other hypotheses
or models, which are able to explain such relationships.
In addition, all model assumptions and their implications are consistent with data. This
includes the key assumption of a sectoral divide in returns to education, the implication of
which is an inverse U relationship between agricultural income levels and the proportion of
children being educated formally. In standard models of child labour, which rely on poverty and
liquidity constraints to explain child labour and lack of schooling, the relation between income
and schooling is generally thought of as (at least globally) monotonic. The simple introduction
of a sectoral divide in returns to education can imply global non-monotonicity. This is not an
implication of modelling human capital investment decisions under uncertainty, but the interval
for which one should expect a negative e¤ect of agricultural income and schooling of sons can
be widened by the presence of uncertainty.
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These analytical and empirical ndings can have potential far-reaching policy implications.
If the objective of an educational policy is full enrolment into primary schools, policy makers
should acknowledge both the role of sons as old-age security providers of their parents and
the strength of the rural/urban sectoral divide, which clearly has implications for the human
capital investment decisions within the household. One obvious, but also very expensive,
policy implication is to copy the state intervention in developed countries, where the state has
diminished the role of an intergenerational contract between parents and children, because they
supply both schooling and old-age security via the tax system. Another more straightforward,
and certainly cheaper, policy implication of the model is that full enrolment can be achieved if
formal education is able to encompass the most important features of traditional education, the
agricultural life-skills enabling children to become locally rooted future farmers. This could be
achieved by introducing practical agricultural subjects focusing on some of the more complex
tasks with high learning potential into the primary school curriculum in rural areas. Subjects,
which at the moment are purely undertaken by parents through traditional education and
learning-by-doing.
40
8 Figures
Figure 3.1. E¤ect of future urban income uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio
Figure 3.2. E¤ect of fertility on the optimal human capital portfolio, for di¤erent levels of
risk "
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Figure 3.3. E¤ect of future urban income uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio
under liquidity constraints, s  0
Figure 3.4. E¤ect of future urban income uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio
under liquidity constraints and child labour, s  0 & ea =  0:03
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Figure 3.5. E¤ect of fertility on the optimal human capital portfolio under liquidity con-
straints, s  0
Figure 3.6. E¤ect of fertility on the optimal human capital portfolio under liquidity con-
straints and child labour, s  0 & ea =  0:03
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Figure 3.7. E¤ect of agricultural income on the optimal human capital portfolio under
liquidity constraints, s  0
Figure 3.8. E¤ect of agricultural income on the optimal human capital portfolio under
liquidity constraints and child labour, s  0 & ea =  0:03
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Figure 5.1. Income levels over average years of formal education among adult males in HH
Figure 5.2. Proportion of formally educated sons over total number of sons in HH
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Figure 5.3. Proportion of formally educated sons over total number of sons in HH, split by
HiEXP
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Figure 5.4. Actual  and predicted probabilitis of model (5)
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Figure 5.5. One-son-behind prediction compared to quadratic N model
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9 Tables
Table 4.1. Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
KHDS II data
Pi (sons) 0.681 0.342 0.000 1.000
Pi (daughters) 0.679 0.346 0.000 1.000
Total number of children 8.208 4.461 1.000 25.000
Total number of sons 4.090 2.555 0.000 16.000
Total number of daughters 4.118 2.778 0.000 16.000
KHDS I data
Daily HH expenditure per AE in USD 0.366 0.200 0.072 2.129
Food share out of total HH expenditure 0.659 0.152 0.211 0.971
Land (ha) 2.244 1.867 0.121 12.222
Herd dummy 0.238 0.427 0.000 1.000
Number of income sources 3.597 0.940 1.000 6.000
Proportion of daughters 0.503 0.227 0.000 1.000
Household size, excl. children -1.127 3.709 -18.000 6.000
Household head has primary education 0.340 0.474 0.000 1.000
Age of household head 50.414 14.215 17.000 95.000
Proportion of Mhaya in village 0.555 0.426 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mnyambo in village 0.127 0.291 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Mhangaza in village 0.159 0.348 0.000 1.000
Proportion of Msubi in village 0.019 0.075 0.000 0.500
Proportion of Mzinza in village 0.011 0.031 0.000 0.150
Proportion of Kishubi in village 0.013 0.035 0.000 0.222
Proportion of other tribes in village 0.117 0.216 0.000 1.000
Tribal fractionalisation index 0.197 0.200 0.000 0.660
Population in village 3919 3501 1254 18526
Av. school distance in village 1.902 1.432 0.027 9.465
Av. school fee in village 0.398 0.149 0.231 1.389
Av. school uniform costs in village 4.253 1.095 2.418 7.579
Pr(migrant children remitting) in village 0.317 0.112 0.067 0.600
No. stud per math book 2.777 1.139 0.970 7.418
No. stud per kiswahili book 4.054 4.591 0.591 34.928
Proportion of A grade teachers in school 0.344 0.121 0.111 0.691
Proportion of B grade teachers in school 0.353 0.217 0.000 0.875
No. stud per classroom 48.890 8.476 29.757 70.103
Observations 365
Note: There are only 353 (352) households with sons (daughters), respectively.
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10 Appendix A1: Map of Kagera and location of KHDS I clus-
ters
Note. This map is copied from Development Research Group (2004).
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